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Consumer Information Privacy and the 
Problem(s) of Third-Party Disclosures 
By Clark D. Asay* 
U.S. consumers have little actual control over how companies collect, use, and disclose 
their personal information.  This Article identifies two specific instances of this lack of 
control under U.S. law related to third-party disclosures, what I call the Incognito and 
Onward Transfer Problems.  It then identifies the types of privacy harms that result and 
examines the advantages and possible drawbacks of a model law aimed at addressing 
these specific problems.  The model law is based on a system of consumer notice and 
choice, the predominant method used in the U.S. to provide consumers with control over 
their information.  Up until this point, however, this method of providing control has 
largely failed, and this Article seeks to address some of its failures.  This Article argues 
that while notice and choice may be useful in addressing some information privacy 
problems (such as the two identified in this Article), it is not appropriate for all 
information privacy problems.  No one-size-fits-all approach is adequate.  Instead, each 
information privacy problem must be isolated and treated in its proper context. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Over forty years ago, Charles Fried, in a now classic law review article, defined 
privacy as the right to “control . . . information about ourselves.”1  Others have proposed 
alternative ways of understanding privacy,
2
 but Fried’s popular conception largely 
underlies the information privacy regime in the U.S. today.
3
  This piecemeal regime—
based on “Fair Information Practice Principles”4—consists of a mix of federal sectoral 
law, state law, FTC enforcement, and industry self-regulation aimed at providing 
consumers with notice and choice about how companies collect, use, and disclose their 
information.  In essence, notice and choice constitute consumers’ opportunity to control 
their information and thereby protect their privacy.
5
 
¶2  Many commentators have noted the deficiencies of notice and choice in providing 
consumers with such control.
6
  Almost no one seems to read privacy notices, for 
 
1
 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968). 
2
 See, e.g., Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) 
(viewing privacy as the right to be let alone); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 
421 (1980) (viewing privacy as a form of limited access to the self); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, 
AND ISOLATION 56 (1992) (conceptualizing privacy in terms of “intimacy”); Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: 
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (identifying the purpose of 
privacy as providing individuals with autonomy for self-development purposes, which, in Cohen’s 
estimation, is crucial to a properly functioning civil society); Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002) (conceptualizing privacy in terms of “family resemblances” rather than trying to 
identify one common denominator for all forms of privacy). 
3
 See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 820, n. 30 (2012) (noting 
that the control conception of privacy has long been the standard in the legal and policy literature); Fred H. 
Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of Individual Choice, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1765, 
1766-68 (2010) [hereinafter Limits of Individual Choice] (noting that the privacy-as-information-control 
approach is prevalent throughout the world, especially in the U.S.).  
4
 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES, 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited Aug. 3, 2012). 
5
 Limits of Individual Choice, supra note 3, at 1767-68. 
6
 See generally id. at 1771-77 (arguing that privacy notices are typically inaccessible, fail to motivate 
consumers to action, do not provide consumers with a real choice, provide consumers with inadequate 
privacy protection, help perpetuate a false dichotomy between personally identifiable information and non-
personally identifiable information, impose significant transaction costs on consumers, impose wasteful 




  Chief Justice John Roberts now famously indicated that he does not read the 
boilerplate with which every consumer is daily confronted.
8
  Judge Richard Posner 
similarly admitted to not reading boilerplate legalese in his mortgage documents.
9
  Others 
contend that even if consumers did read privacy notices, they would not understand them 
because they are written in a manner inaccessible to consumers.
10
  And yet others have 
focused on the choice mechanism and criticized, for instance, opt-out choices as too 
easily manipulated by companies to serve their own purposes
11
 and opt-in mechanisms as 
too costly to businesses while failing to provide consumers with offsetting benefits.
12
  
Because of these and other issues, some have largely ruled out notice and choice as an 
effective means to protect consumers’ privacy.13  Consumers appear to agree.14 
¶3  Despite these criticisms, this Article argues that notice and choice can and should 
play a significant role—even if not the only role—in providing consumers with control 
over their information privacy.  And, as this Article will argue, this conception of privacy 
as information control remains relevant in understanding and addressing certain privacy 
problems and harms.  That notice and choice should play a significant role, but not the 
only role, suggests something important: a one-size-fits-all approach to information 
privacy problems, based on Fair Information Practice Principles, has proven and will 
remain unviable.  Notice and choice may work for some information privacy problems, 
but not for others.  Information privacy problems, therefore, must be isolated and 
addressed separately.   
 
costs on businesses, fail to protect consumers against government access to sensitive personal information, 
and potentially undermine important industries, such as the credit reporting system); Fred H. Cate, The 
Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 
‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343-44 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) [hereinafter Failure of Fair Information], 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156972 (noting that notices are typically 
meaningless because consumers typically do not read them or choose to ignore them, they are written in 
overly technical language, they present no meaningful opportunity for individual choice, and they 
potentially interfere with important activities to society, such as credit reporting and national security).  
7
 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE iii, 19-20 
(2010), available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (noting that consumers 
typically do not read privacy notices because they are long and incomprehensible). 
8
 Mike Masnick, Supreme Court Chief Justice Admits He Doesn’t Read Online EULAs or Other ‘Fine 






 Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 107-12 (2001). 
11
 Jeff Sovern, Opting In Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal 
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999) [hereinafter Opting In Opting Out]. 
12
 Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, The Impact of Opt-In Privacy Rules on Retail Markets: A Case 
Study of MBNA, 52 DUKE L.J. 745 (2003). 
13
 See Limits of Individual Choice, supra note 3, at 1801-03 (arguing that in most settings, notice and 
choice are “neither the best tool for protecting our privacy nor an appropriate goal of our privacy laws”); 
James P. Nehf, The FTC's Proposed Framework for Privacy Protection Online: A Move Toward 
Substantive Controls or Just More Notice and Choice?, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1727, 1745 (2011) 
(arguing that even an enhanced notice and choice regime will prove “wholly ineffectual” due to inherent 
defects in the notice and choice approach); Failure of Fair Information, supra note 6, at 344-45 (arguing 
that notice and choice, without substantive data processing restrictions, will continue to be ineffective in 
protecting privacy).  
14
 Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It 21 
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214 (indicating that 67% of consumers feel that they 
have lost all control over how companies collect and use their personal information). 
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¶4  This Article isolates two such problems related to third-party disclosures.  Under 
the current piecemeal regime, even in the typical best-case scenario, consumers have no 
real control over third-party disclosures.  To illustrate: companies generally provide 
consumers with some notice and choice regarding third-party disclosure of their personal 
information, typically as part of a blanket opt-in/opt-out approach.  But such notice and 
choice is defective because consumers receive little to no information about who 
specifically will receive their information and how they will use it (what I call the 
“Incognito Problem”).  Furthermore, once consumers’ information is the hands of such 
third parties, U.S. law provides consumers with even fewer protections (what I call the 
“Onward Transfer Problem”).   
¶5  Indeed, even if consumers read and perfectly understood all applicable privacy 
notices, and even if they exercised their opt-in and opt-out rights in every instance, in 
most cases they would still lack effective control over their information because of the 
Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems.  While control over information may entail 
many things, at a basic level it must include determining with whom your information is 
shared and for what purposes.  As a result of this lack of control, consumers experience 
distinct subjective and objective privacy harms. 
¶6  To address these problems and the resulting privacy harms, this Article explores the 
possible benefits and potential drawbacks of federal legislation that would require 
companies to provide consumers with notice and choice regarding the specific third party 
recipients of their information and their intended uses.  It does so by constructing and 
examining one possible model law.  This examination is particularly relevant at a time 
when Congress continues to consider information privacy legislation that, some 
complain, simply enshrines the status quo.
15
 
¶7  This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the current U.S. approach to the 
issue of third-party disclosure and highlights the problem that, even in the typical best-
case scenario, consumers remain uninformed about who specifically will have access to 
their information and how they will use it.  This scenario, which plays out because of the 
Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems, effectively undermines consumer control over 
their information.  Part II examines the nature of the resulting privacy harms and offers 
reasons for why we might be skeptical of privacy harm skepticism.  Part III then explores 
a system of notice and choice aimed at addressing the Incognito and Onward Transfer 
Problems, the privacy harms that result from them, and common critiques of notice and 
choice as an effective regulatory means.  Part IV concludes by analyzing the proposal’s 
 
15
 See, e.g., Danny Weitzner, We Can’t Wait: Obama Administration Calls for A Consumer Privacy Bill 
of Rights for the Digital Age, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2012, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-calls-consumer-privacy-
bill-rights-digital-age (discussing a recently released Obama administration blueprint for a consumer 
privacy “Bill of Rights”); Tim Conneally, Two New Internet Privacy Bills Enter Congress: How They 
Differ, BETANEWS (Apr. 14, 2011), http://betanews.com/2011/04/14/two-new-internet-privacy-bills-enter-
congress-how-they-differ/ (discussing the basics of two privacy bills that are currently under 
consideration). Several groups have criticized the McCain-Kerry bill in particular for simply enshrining 
current industry practices, as well as failing to provide consumers with a legal right of action against 
companies that fail to protect their privacy. See, e.g., Consumer Groups Welcome Bipartisan Privacy 
Effort, but Warn Kerry-McCain Bill Insufficient to Protect Consumers’ Online Privacy, CENTER FOR 
DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.democraticmedia.org/consumer-groups-welcome-
bipartisan-privacy-effort-warn-kerry-mccain-bill-insufficient-protect-consum. 
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advantages and potential drawbacks, as well as positing some lessons learned from this 
study for addressing other information privacy problems. 
II. THE CURRENT U.S. PRIVACY REGIME 
¶8  The most significant pieces of the U.S. regime governing consumer information 
privacy and third-party disclosures are set forth below. 
A. Federal Sectoral Laws 
¶9  Unlike the Europe Union (E.U.) and other parts of the world that have adopted 
comprehensive privacy legislation, the U.S. has adopted several federal sectoral laws that 
target specific industries and types of personal information.
16
  Consequently, if a 
company does not fall within that specific industry, or if the type of personal information 
that the law covers is not involved, the sectoral law does not apply to either the entity or 
the information.   
¶10  For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
only applies to “covered entities”—health plans, health care providers, health care 
clearinghouses and, in some cases, business associates of the same—that have access to a 
person’s protected health information.17  The Fair Credit and Reporting Act (FCRA) 
covers consumer reporting agencies that compile or use “consumer reports.”18  The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) limits itself to “financial institutions”—entities 
significantly involved in financial activities as defined under the Act—that handle non-
public financial information.
19
  The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 
covers operators of commercial websites and online services directed to children under 
the age of thirteen, or such entities that knowingly collect personal information of 
children under the age of thirteen.
20
  And the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) 
applies to “video tape service providers”21 that rent, sell, or deliver “prerecorded video 
cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.”22 
 
16
 This Article does not address the question of whether comprehensive privacy law in the U.S. would be 
appropriate. For opposing viewpoints on this general question, compare Jill L. Joerling, Data Breach 
Notification Laws: An Argument for a Comprehensive Federal Law to Protect Consumer Data, 32 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 467 (2010) (advocating for comprehensive privacy regulation), with Paul M. Schwartz, 
Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 903 (2009) (advocating against comprehensive privacy regulation).  
17
 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Understanding HIPPA Privacy: For Covered Entities, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/index.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
18
 Subject to certain exceptions, “consumer reports” are defined as “any written, oral, or other 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit 
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode 
of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as 
a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for (A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes; (B) employment purposes; or (C) any other purpose authorized 
under section 1681b . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a. 
19
 FED. TRADE COMM’N, In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
(Jul. 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/idtheft/bus53.shtm.   
20
 FED. TRADE COMM’N, Frequently Asked Questions About the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Rule, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/coppafaqs.shtm (last revised Oct. 7, 2008). 
21
 There is some disagreement among courts regarding who constitutes a “video tape service provider” 
under VPPA.  Compare Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 236 (D.N.J. 1996) (ruling that the 
VPPA may apply to other parties in addition to video tape service providers, such as law enforcement 
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¶11  All of these industry-specific laws require covered entities to provide forms of 
notice and choice to affected consumers before disclosing those consumers’ covered 
information to third parties.
23
  COPPA, for instance, requires affected entities to post an 
online privacy policy depicting how they collect, use, and disclose personal information, 
and to give the parents of children a choice as to whether an affected entity may disclose 
the child’s personal information to third parties.24  GLBA similarly requires affected 
entities to provide consumers with notice about an affected entity’s collection, use and 
disclosure practices, as well as an opt-out of some sharing of personal financial 
information with non-affiliated third parties.
25
  HIPAA requires covered entities to use 
protected health information only for purposes of treatment, payment, or operations; 
otherwise, the covered entity must obtain specific opt-in authorization that details the 
information to be disclosed, the purposes of disclosure, and the entity to which disclosure 
will be made.
26
  Under HIPAA, consumers have a right to receive an accounting of the 
third-party disclosures of their personal information.
27
  Under FCRA, users of consumer 
reports must give the subjects of such consumer reports notice and the opportunity to 
review the information in them when and if such user takes an adverse action based on 
that information.
28
  FCRA also provides a private right of action.
29
  Finally, VPPA 
includes a general ban on disclosing personally identifiable rental information unless the 
consumer consents specifically in writing.
30
  However, video tape service providers may 
disclose to third parties “genre preferences” along with the names and addresses of the 
consumers, so long as the consumer was provided an opt-out mechanism.
31
 
¶12  In terms of consumer control over their information privacy, several problems arise 
with this sectoral approach.  Perhaps most obviously, the laws only cover certain types of 
information and entities, thus leaving many other types of personal information and 
business entities unaccountable, including much of consumers’ online activity.  
Furthermore, while the laws do require some amount of notice and choice before the 
covered entities may disclose the information to third parties, with the exception of 
HIPAA and VPPA in certain limited circumstances, this notice and choice comes in the 
form of a blanket opt-in/opt-out approach.  The consumer does not actually know 
specifically who will receive their information and how such third parties will use it and 
further disclose it, thereby leaving the consumer with little to no control over their 
information.  These laws thus suffer from the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems.  
 
officers), with Daniel v. Cantell, 375 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2004) (ruling that the VPPA only applies to video 
tape service providers). 
22
 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 840 (4th ed. 2011).    
23
 This Article obviously cannot and does not list every federal statute that regulates consumer privacy 
in some manner or another, but instead focuses on some of the more well-known ones. For a more 
comprehensive list of federal statutes that implicate privacy, see id. at 37-39.    
24
 Frequently Asked Questions About the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, supra note 20.  
25
 In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, supra note 19. 
26




 FED. TRADE COMM’N, NOTICE TO USERS OF CONSUMER REPORTS: OBLIGATIONS OF USERS UNDER 




ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, Video Privacy Protection Act, http://www.epic.org/privacy/vppa/ 
(last visited July 6, 2012). 
31
 Id. 
Vol. 11:5] Clark D. Asay 
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Lastly, with the exception of FCRA, none of these statutes include a private right of 
action.  Consequently, consumers must rely on either the FTC or state attorney generals 
to protect their interests under the laws. 
B. The FTC 
¶13  In addition to helping enforce these sectoral laws, the FTC regulates privacy issues 
on the basis of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
32
  Under this Act, the FTC investigates and 
brings actions against companies that engage in “unfair” or “deceptive” trade practices.33  
“Unfair trade practices” are defined as commercial conduct that (i) causes (or is likely to 
cause) substantial injury to consumers (ii) that consumers cannot reasonably avoid 
themselves, and (iii) without offsetting benefits to consumers or competition.
34
  
“Deceptive trade practices” are defined as commercial conduct that includes false or 
misleading claims, or claims that omit material facts.
35
  With respect to deceptive trade 
practices, consumer injury does not need to occur; the mere fact that a company has 
engaged in such deceptive practices is actionable.
36
  
¶14  What constitutes a deceptive or unfair trade practice has evolved, depending on 
what business practices the FTC has deemed problematic at any given time.
37
  The FTC 
has brought actions against companies for reasons ranging from companies’ failure to 
implement sufficient security measures given the sensitivity of the information collected, 
to companies stating certain privacy practices in their privacy notices while not actually 
following them.
38
  Furthermore, the FTC has recently brought actions against companies 
for failure to adequately disclose their information-handling practices in cases where such 
handling involves sensitive information.
39
   
¶15  However, such FTC enforcement fails to address the Incognito and Onward 
Transfer Problems.  As of yet, the FTC has failed to require notice and choice similar to 
what is called for in HIPAA—identification of specific third parties and their intended 
uses—and has instead relied on the industry standard opt-in/opt-out regime that in reality 
provides consumers with little useful information.  In fact, other than a few limited 
cases,
40
 the FTC has not even made clear that notice and choice are required in the first 
place.  Instead, typically its actions have focused on a company’s failure to abide by its 
stated privacy practices, whatever those may be.
41
  Consequently, the FTC’s role in 
 
32
 See generally FED. RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (June 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf. 
33
 Id. at 1. 
34
 PETER SWIRE & SOL BERMANN, INFORMATION PRIVACY 70 (2007). 
35




 For a general assessment of the FTC as a privacy enforcer, see Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet 
Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000).   
38
 See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, Legal Resources (2013), http://business.ftc.gov/legal-
resources/8/35 (last visited Jan. 14, 2013).  
39
 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Settles with Company that Failed to Tell Parents That Children’s 
Information Would be Disclosed to Marketers, Nov. 30, 2010, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/echometrix.shtm; FED. TRADE COMM’N, Sears Settles FTC Charges 




 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, Gateway Learning Settles FTC Privacy Charges, (July 7, 2004), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/gateway.shtm (bringing an action against and settling with Gateway 
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protecting information privacy has similarly left consumers with no real control over 
third-party disclosures. 
C. State Law 
1. Statutory Law 
¶16  State statutory law also provides little reason for comfort from an information 
privacy perspective.  California’s “Shine the Light Law,” for instance, theoretically gives 
consumers greater control over their information by requiring covered companies to 
disclose their information-sharing practices to consumers, and, upon request, to provide 
consumers with a list of companies with which they have shared the consumer’s 
information for marketing purposes.
42
 
¶17  However, such laws are not widespread; at the time of this writing, California is the 
only state to have adopted such a law.
43
  Furthermore, even under the California law, if 
companies provide the consumer with an opt-out or opt-in option, then such companies 
are exempt from the law and need not disclose to consumers the third parties with which 
the company shared or may share their information.
44
  Lastly, even if the consumer 
somehow obtained access to the list of companies with which the initial company shared 
its information, the law does not provide any recourse to the consumer—consumers have 
no right to require the third party to stop using or disgorge their information.  
Consequently, even under California law, which many acknowledge as having some of 
the strongest consumer privacy protections in the U.S.,
45
 consumers typically remain 
subject to the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems.
46
 
¶18  Most states do not even go so far as to require that companies develop privacy 
policies, let alone requiring useful notice and choice.  California does require online 
companies to post a privacy policy indicating their information and disclosures 
practices.
47
  Utah has adopted laws requiring certain companies to disclose to consumers 
 
Learning for its failure to abide by its stated privacy practices). 
42
 PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, California's "Shine the Light" Law Goes into Effect Jan. 1, 2005, 
(Dec. 29, 2004), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/SB27Release.htm.  
43
 PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, Fact Sheet 4(a): California's "Shine the Light" Law, (July 2005), 
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs4a-shinelight.htm#10.  
44
 See California's "Shine the Light" Law Goes into Effect Jan. 1, 2005, supra note 42. 
45
 See, e.g., Martyn Williams, California to Get Tough on Behalf of Online Privacy, PCWORLD (Jul. 19, 
2012), 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/259534/california_to_get_tough_on_behalf_of_online_priv
acy.html (summarizing a new privacy enforcement initiative of California Attorney General Kamala D. 
Harris and noting that California has some of the strictest privacy regulations in the U.S. and has often 
acted as a bellwether state for privacy regulation); see also SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 871 
(indicating it is “probably safe to generalize that California has the strongest privacy law in the United 
States”).   
46
 This is because most companies provide some form of opt-in or opt-out in order to avoid having to 
disclose to consumers the third parties with which they have shared consumers’ information. However, as 
discussed throughout, blanket opt-in/opt-out choices do not eliminate the Incognito and Onward Transfer 
Problems, but instead perpetuate them. 
47
 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22575(a). Interestingly, it remains unclear whether the California law 
covers mobile applications and their providers, through which companies collect vast amounts of sensitive 
information. The California Attorney General, Kamala D. Harris, has publicly stated that she believes they 
are covered and intends to enforce the law against mobile application providers that fail to post privacy 
policies. To that end, the State of California and six of the largest technology companies in the world—
Vol. 11:5] Clark D. Asay 
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what types of information they may disclose to third parties.
48
  Connecticut also requires 
a privacy policy to be posted in the event that an entity collects social security numbers.
49
  
However, none of these state statutes require notice and choice about the specific third 
parties to be included in the privacy policies.
50
  Under state privacy statutes, then, 
consumers remain subject to the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems.
51
 
¶19  All states also have some form of a deceptive trade practices act.52  These laws are 
similar to the FTC Act in scope, and state courts have typically followed the FTC’s lead 
in interpreting what constitutes a deceptive or unfair trade practice.
53
  Some states have 
been more generous to consumers under their acts,
54
 and so, theoretically at least, state 
deceptive trade practices acts could help address the Incognito and Onward Transfer 
Problems.  However, up until now states have failed to interpret their statutes to address 
these issues, and nothing suggests this will change anytime soon. 
2. Common Law 
¶20  Another possible solution to the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems is state 
common law.  Almost all states recognize certain privacy torts at common law.
55
  
Generally, these include: (1) intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs; 
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity which places a person in 
a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of one’s name or likeness.56  Some 
have advanced these as the best means to protect consumer information privacy.  One 
organization claims these torts are sufficient, and any proposed administrative regulations 
would simply burden companies with no real privacy benefits to consumers.
57
  Some 
have advanced the tort of appropriation in particular as the best hope for protecting 
consumer information privacy in the modern world of data mining, in part because other 




Amazon.com, Inc., Apple, Inc., Google, Inc., Hewlett-Packard Company, Microsoft Corporation, and 
Research In Motion Limited—recently drafted a non-binding Joint Statement of Principles aimed at 
promoting privacy best practices among mobile application developers. See Attorney General Kamala D. 
Harris Secures Global Agreement to Strengthen Privacy Protections for Users of Mobile Applications, 
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Feb. 22. 2012), http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-
d-harris-secures-global-agreement-strengthen-privacy.  
48
 See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Selected State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, 






 This section obviously does not cover all state statutes that implicate consumer privacy.  For instance, 
both Minnesota and Nevada have laws requiring Internet service providers to keep private certain 
information about their consumers, unless the consumer gives the ISP permission to disclose the 
information.  See Selected State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, supra note 48.  However, these laws 
only cover ISPs, and other state statutes are similarly or otherwise limited in their application.  
52




 Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1305, 1352-53, 1357 (2001). 
55
 See The Privacy Torts: How U.S. State Law Quietly Leads the Way in Privacy Protection, 
PRIVACILLA.ORG (July 2002), http://www.privacilla.org/releases/Torts_Report.html. 
56
 See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (systematically spelling out for the first 
time the four general categories of privacy torts). 
57
 The Privacy Torts, supra note 55. 
58
 Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer 
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¶21  However, in terms of information privacy, these torts largely fail to provide 
consumers with much recourse at all.  The torts and their standards regarding information 
privacy are outdated and have not been adequately adapted to take into account new 
technologies and their effects on information privacy.  For instance, courts have been 
reluctant to recognize privacy torts in cases where the information collected was publicly 
available or where a reasonable person would not be offended by the collection in each 
instance, even though modern database compilation technologies can quickly render 
thousands of such bits of information about a person into a sensitive, comprehensive 
profile.
59
  The Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems exacerbate this situation by 
making it easy for companies to share such information with third parties.   
¶22  Courts have also tended to adopt a binary view of privacy—some bit of information 
is either public or private—when in reality information is only rarely entirely public or 
private in the modern age; context matters.
60
  Other commentators point out that the 
privacy torts rely on a concept of physical space to define privacy expectations and 
harm.
61
  As a result, courts in applying privacy torts to the digitized world have largely 
neglected privacy harm that does not fit neatly into the old paradigm.
62
   
¶23  Another more obvious shortcoming exists: since most companies do provide 
consumers with some form of notice and choice, technically the torts would not apply 
because the consumer had “notice” and therefore had no expectation of privacy, or 
because the consumer had provided their “consent” to the companies’ practices.63  
However, as argued throughout, this notice and consent in almost all cases is severely 
deficient due to the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems.  As a result of the privacy 
torts’ general inadequacies, commentators have called for reform of the privacy torts in 




Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2003). 
59
 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 









 See, e.g., Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (ruling that the 
plaintiffs failed to successfully allege the tort of invasion of seclusion because they voluntarily provided 
spending information to American Express through use of the American Express card, which American 
Express was then free to disclose to third parties in connection with marketing activities, despite the 
plaintiff’s additional claim of appropriation); see also Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1975) (reaching a similar conclusion on the tort of appropriation claim because the tort of 
appropriation is only available if a person’s name or likeness is publicly displayed to indicate the person 
endorses a particular product or service. In this case, Time was selling its subscription lists to direct mail 
advertising businesses).    
64
 See Abril, supra note 61; Richards & Solove, supra note 59; see also Neil M. Richards, The Limits of 
Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (2011) (arguing that the traditional privacy torts, in 
addition to being ineffective in the modern age, in some cases also conflict with First Amendment 
doctrines, and suggesting other tort doctrines, such as trespass and confidentiality, as possible remedies to 
today’s privacy issues); Lior Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007 (2010) (arguing 
that the privacy tort categories should be abandoned and replaced with a unitary tort for invasion of 
privacy); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000) 
(proposing as a partial solution to the privacy torts’ inadequacies reliance on the tort of breach of 
confidentiality); Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal 
Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140 (2007) (advocating creation of a common law tort based on Fair 
Information Practices). 
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¶24  State contract law could also be a source of information privacy protection.  Eugene 
Volokh has raised this possibility.
65
  However, this solution is implausible for several 
reasons.  First, unless companies voluntarily addressed the Incognito and Onward 
Transfer Problems in contracts with consumers,
66
 then those problems would remain 
unaddressed.  Furthermore, even if solutions to these problems were adopted as the 
default rules, freedom of contract would allow companies to disclaim them, which they 
almost undoubtedly would.
67
  Lastly, damages under contract law are generally limited to 
economic losses flowing directly from the breach.
68
  Because privacy harms are often 
difficult to measure in terms of direct economic losses, contract law would provide 
consumers with insufficient remedies for information privacy violations. 
D. Self-Regulation 
¶25  In addition to federal and state law, industry self-regulation is a significant part of 
the U.S. approach to information privacy.  Because consumers have become increasingly 
wary of providing their personal information to companies for fear of theft, misuse, or, 
simply, the unknown, many companies have responded by developing and adopting 
privacy “best practices,” joining privacy “seal” programs such as TrustE,69 or joining 
privacy alliances such as the Online Privacy Alliance.
70
 
¶26  In general, such best practices require companies to provide consumers with notice 
regarding what information the company collects, how the company will use it, and the 
types of third parties with which the company will share this information.
71
  Furthermore, 
if the company wishes to disclose personal information to third parties for purposes other 
than for which the company collected the information, the company should provide the 
consumer with a choice regarding such disclosure in the form of an opt-in or opt-out.
72
 
¶27  Two drawbacks to the self-regulation approach immediately become obvious, 
however: adequacy and enforcement.  That is, given companies’ self-interest in retaining 
flexibility with respect to the consumer information, it is doubtful that a self-regulatory 
approach gives companies the right set of incentives to provide consumers with adequate 
protection and control.
73
  Furthermore, the self-regulation approach relies primarily on 
 
65
 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right 
to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
66
 One commentator notes that online companies often incorporate their privacy notices into their terms 
of use, and therefore the privacy notice becomes part of a contract between the consumer and company.  
Otherwise courts have typically not found privacy notices to be enforceable contracts. However, companies 
typically will construct privacy notices to favor themselves, and so the incorporation of the privacy notice 
into the enforceable terms of use is not generally beneficial to consumers. See Allyson W. Haynes, Online 
Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587 
(2007).  
67
 See Volokh, supra note 65, at 1061-62. 
68
 In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a well-
settled principle of contract law is that only economic damages are available for breaches of contract, and 
in the instant case the only damages that the plaintiff suffered were non-economic privacy harms).   
69
 See generally TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).  
70
 See generally PRIVACYALLIANCE.ORG, http://www.privacyalliance.org/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).  
71
 See Protecting Customer Information Online, TRUSTE, 




 See Ira Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S, J.L. 
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 356-57 (2011) (noting the many deficiencies of the self-regulation model, 
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companies regulating their own behavior,
74
 although the FTC’s enforcement activities 




¶28  But even if companies do abide by these so-called “best practices,” such best 
practices still suffer from the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems.  A best practice 
from the consumer’s point of view—and from the perspective of privacy as information 
control—would include consumers receiving notice and choice regarding who 
specifically is receiving their information and how that company will use it, rather than 
merely a general notice that unidentified third parties may in the future receive and use 
their personal information in manners similarly unknown.  As with the other pieces of the 




E. The U.S. Department of Commerce Safe Harbor 
¶29  E.U. law has also influenced U.S. consumer privacy law and, therefore, provides an 
additional source of information privacy regulation in the U.S.  The E.U. has 
implemented comprehensive privacy regulation pursuant to the E.U. Data Protection 
Directive (95/46/EC) (the “Directive”).  Under the Directive, the E.U. has deemed that 
U.S. law provides “inadequate” protection of consumer data, and thus forbids transfers of 
such data from the E.U. to the U.S. absent an exception.
77
  As one such exception, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, together with the European Commission, has developed 
a safe harbor framework.
78
  Under the safe harbor framework, U.S. companies, by 
adhering to certain information privacy principles, can self-certify that they provide 
“adequate” privacy protections sufficient to permit a transfer of data under the 
Directive.
79
   
¶30  One of the Directive’s principles, “Onward Transfer”, requires certifying 
companies to provide notice and choice before disclosing information to third parties.
80
  
In addition, where a certifying company wishes to transfer information to a third party 
acting as its agent, it must either ascertain that the third party subscribes to the same 
principles, is subject to the Directive, qualifies for another adequacy finding, or enter into 
 
including weak enforcement and free rider issues); Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1461, 1524-27 (2000) (suggesting the self-regulation model is a chimera whose real purpose is to 




 See supra Part I.B. 
76
 For a poignant recent example of why self-regulation is severely deficient, see Nicole Perlroth & Nick 
Bilton, Mobile Apps Take Data Without Permission, N.Y. TIMES TECH. BLOG (Feb. 15, 2012, 10:09 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/google-and-mobile-apps-take-data-books-without-permission/ 
(discussing a maelstrom of consumer outrage over an alleged industry “best practice” of mobile application 
companies taking sensitive address book information from smartphones without consumers’ notice or 
consent).  
77
 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp 






 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp (last updated Jan. 30, 2009). 
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a written agreement with such third party requiring that the third party provide at least the 
same level of privacy protection as the principles require.
81
   
¶31  The safe harbor thus only applies to the certifying company and, with the exception 
of third parties acting as “agents,” does not require the certifying entity to impose any 
controls on third parties obtaining information from them.  The Onward Transfer 
Problem thus persists.  And, even though participating companies must provide notice 
and choice, this notice and choice suffers from the same Incognito Problem: blanket opt-
in/opt-out without identification of the specific third parties or their specific uses.   
¶32  Furthermore, even if a savvy consumer was aware of a company’s self-certification 
and became aware that such company had violated the principles, that consumer would 
have no recourse.  They would be solely dependent on the Department of Commerce to 
police the company.  And even if the Department of Commerce had the resources to 
police companies and enforce these principles in all cases, they could only do so against 
those companies that wished to transfer consumer data between the U.S. and the E.U. and 
which had self-certified.  Consequently, though the safe harbor provides greater 
consumer information privacy protection than would likely exist without it, it still falls 
short in addressing the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems. 
III. SO WHAT’S THE HARM? 
¶33  So far this Article has shown that in most cases U.S. consumers have little real 
knowledge or choice about which specific third parties may have their information and 
how those third parties will use and further disclose such information.  These Incognito 
and Onward Transfer Problems effectively undermine any real consumer control over 
their information.  Arguably, however, these Problems only need redress if consumers are 
suffering significant harm as a result.  The next section addresses this issue. 
A. Addressing Privacy Harm Skepticism 
¶34  Some have downplayed the concept of privacy harm in general.82  Richard Posner 
claims that “as long as people do not expect that the details of their health, love life, 
finances, and so forth, will be used to harm them in their interactions with other people, 
they are content to reveal those details to strangers . . .” because Americans have become 
“habituated . . . to radically diminished information privacy.”83  Others contend that 
whatever minimal privacy harm that may result from privacy violations is offset by the 





 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978) (indicating that in most 
cases people want privacy solely in order to be able to conceal discreditable information about themselves, 
rather than due to legitimate privacy harms they are suffering); Jonathan Franzen, How to Be Alone: Essays 
42, 45-46 (2003) (indicating that Americans only care about privacy in the abstract); Juliana Gruenwald, 
Lawmakers Tangle Over Consumer Harm From Lack of Privacy Rules, NATIONALJOURNAL.COM (May 9, 
2012, 5:24 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/lawmakers-tangle-over-consumer-harm-from-lack-
of-privacy-rules-20120509 (reporting on a legislative debate between Senators John Kerry and Pat Toomey 
in which Senator Toomey remains skeptical that consumers are experiencing privacy harm through data 
collection and use). 
83
 Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 249-51 (2008).  
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the form of more relevant advertising, cheaper products, and expedited services.
84
  Courts 
also have been reluctant to award damages for privacy harm without something more 
specific or “actual” than abstract claims of mental injury.85   
¶35  Others have argued that if consumers continue to disclose their information to 
companies in exchange for those companies’ goods and services, and fail to take 
advantage of technological, legal, and other solutions available to them, arguably 
whatever privacy harms consumers may be experiencing are offset by the perceived 
benefits; otherwise consumers would change their behavior.
86
  Some evidence suggests 
consumers are willing to sell their personal information to companies quite cheaply.
87
  
Thus, though seemingly all available consumer surveys suggest consumers are worried 
about their information privacy,
88 
 according to this line of argument they are obviously 
not that worried.   
¶36  However, simply because consumers may have become habituated to decreased 
information privacy does not mean that they do not experience privacy harms.  As Posner 
himself notes, it is virtually impossible to participate in the modern world without 
disclosing vast amounts of information about oneself to third parties.
89
  Thus, rather than 
a conscious choice by consumers, the tradeoff between decreased information privacy 
and the benefits of disclosure in many cases seems to be something to which consumers 
have simply become resigned.
90
  Viewed in this light, decreased information privacy 
 
84
 See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Principles of Internet Privacy, 32 CONN. L. REV. 877 (2000) (arguing that the 
free flow of information is not only a vital part of a democratic society, but also benefits consumers in the 
form of faster and better services and products); Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A 
Pragmatic Look at the Costs of Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 2, 39, 46, 48 (2000) (making similar claims as Cate). 
85
 M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1132, 1132 n.2 (2011); see also Doe v. 
Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004) (holding that in order to qualify for statutory damages for violations of the 
Privacy Act of 1974, plaintiffs must show more evidence of actual harm than simply conclusory allegations 
of distress).  As discussed in supra Part I.C.2, this reluctance of the courts to recognize privacy harm is yet 
another reason to doubt the efficacy of privacy torts (at least in their current form) in helping address the 
issues raised in this Article. 
86
 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, The Privacy Hoax, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/1014/042.html (arguing along these lines that consumers do not seem 




 See, e.g., Allison Enright, Consumers Worry About Online Privacy, but Shop Anyway, INTERNET 
RETAILER (May 11, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.internetretailer.com/2012/05/11/consumers-worry-about-
online-privacy-shop-anyway; Alex Palmer, Report: 90% of Consumers Worry About Online Privacy, 
DIRECT MARKETING NEWS (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.dmnews.com/report-90-of-consumers-worry-about-
online-privacy/article/227373/; Mary Beth Quirk, Consumer Reports Survey Confirms That We’re Worried 
About Online Privacy, THE CONSUMERIST (Apr. 3, 2012, 5:00 PM), 
http://consumerist.com/2012/04/consumer-reports-survey-confirms-that-were-worried-about-online-
privacy.html; Janet Jaiswal, Survey Results Are In: Consumers Say Privacy is a Bigger Concern Than 
Security on Smartphones, TRUSTE BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.truste.com/blog/2011/04/27/survey-
results-are-in-consumers-say-privacy-is-a-bigger-concern-than-security-on-smartphones/.  
89
 See Posner, supra note 83. 
90
 This sense of consumer helplessness is what Daniel J. Solove identifies as the primary privacy 
problem resulting from computer databases. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer 
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001); see also Turow, supra 
note 14 (indicating that the majority of consumers feel like they have lost all control over how companies 
use and collect their personal information). 
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might be considered a negative externality that companies impose on consumers rather 
than internalizing it themselves.
91
   
¶37  Furthermore, the failure of the average consumer to take advantage of technological 
and other means of protecting their information privacy is not surprising.  The average 
consumer is not a technologist and so is typically unaware of software programs, browser 
settings, and other means of protecting their privacy.
92
  Or even if they do know about 
them, generally they do not know how to use them.
93
  Because consumers generally do 
not read privacy notices or pay much attention to them, the fact that they do not scrutinize 
companies’ practices and proactively protect their privacy is also not surprising.94  The 
Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems suggest that even if they did, they would still 
not have control over their information, at least with respect to third-party disclosures.  
These realities thus should not be read as evidence that consumers avoid significant 
privacy harms in the current piecemeal privacy regime, or that they do not care much 
about privacy in general.  Seemingly all available surveys suggest otherwise.
95
  More 
likely, these realities may simply mean that the average consumer feels helpless with 
respect to their information privacy and the privacy harms that they experience.
96
 
B. Defining the Harm 
¶38  Ryan Calo recently grouped privacy harms into two categories that are helpful in 
defining the nature of this harm more clearly: subjective and objective privacy harm.
97
  
Subjective privacy harm may result from a perception of unwanted observation or 
surveillance,
98
 or simply from an utter feeling of helplessness or lack of control over 
information about oneself.
99
  For example, as consumers become increasingly aware of 
companies creating databases of information about them (or even, simply, perceive that 
such may be a possibility), subjective privacy harm may result due to anxieties associated 
with these activities.
100
  This discomfort may grow as consumers become more aware of 
 
91
 Opting In Opting Out, supra note 11, at 1116. 
92
 See DEP’T FOR CULTURE, MEDIA, & SPORT, RESEARCH INTO CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING AND 
MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET COOKIES AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE EU ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAMEWORK 2-3 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/consultations/PwC_Internet_Cookies_final.pdf (U.K. study indicating 
that 85% of respondents were unaware of internet cookie “opt-out” solutions, and only 9% of respondents 
were aware of the possibility of anonymous browsing).  
93
 Id. (indicating that the majority of survey respondents had very limited understanding of internet 
cookies and how they work). 
94
 Jeff Sovern argues that companies often purposefully impose significant transactions costs on 
consumers to make it less likely that consumers will exercise whatever choices they may have. Opting In 
Opting Out, supra note 11. See also Turow, supra note 14 (study suggesting that most consumers mistake 
the existence of a privacy policy as evidence that a company cannot share the consumer’s information 
without their consent).  
95
 See supra note 88 for a sampling. See also DEP’T FOR CULTURE, supra note 92, at 2 (indicating that 
75% of survey respondents were concerned with the abuse of personal information sent over the Internet). 
96
 See Turow, supra note 14. 
97




 Solove, supra note 90, at 1421 (arguing that the privacy harm resulting from the collection and use of 
personal information as part of computer databases is best understood as a form of powerlessness without 
meaningful consumer participation).    
100
 Calo, supra note 85; see also Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 489-
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companies routinely sharing their information with the government for surveillance and 
law enforcement purposes.
101
  Such discomfort may cause the consumer to alter their 
behavior in meaningful ways, resulting in a form of social control that potentially inhibits 
freedom and personal autonomy.
102
  This form of harm was one of the motivations 
behind the Privacy Act of 1974, which regulates the government’s collection, use, and 
disclosure of information about its citizens.
103
   
¶39  Objective privacy harm may follow when that same information is used against the 
consumer in an unexpected, forced manner.
104
  Identity theft, wrongful disclosure of 
information that results in damage to a consumer’s financial reputation, blackmail, or a 
widespread data security breach are all examples of this type of objective privacy 
harm.
105
  Unwanted spam, junk mail, solicitations, and other undesired contacts can also 
be viewed as a form of this privacy harm since they often cause consumers to waste 
significant amounts of time and money protecting against such activities.  This form of 
privacy harm was also one of the motivations behind the Privacy Act of 1974.
106
   
¶40  The Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems play a crucial role in causing both 
types of harms.  Indeed, as consumers become increasingly aware through media reports 
or otherwise about the vast amounts of information companies are gathering and sharing 
with others,
107
 subjective privacy harm becomes more likely because consumers are 
completely helpless to stop the exchanges.  While some consumers may not give any 
thought to these issues, many do, and so subjective privacy harm may result for people 
more worried about information privacy issues.
108
  Ignorance may be bliss for some, but 
 
91 (2006) (categorizing harmful privacy activities into four distinct categories that, though not categorized 
in this “subjective” v. “objective” dichotomy, identify many of the same harms). 
101
 See Christopher Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 595 (2004) (indicating that government has access to large amounts of personal information on 
consumers through commercial data brokers); see also The Att’y Gen.’s Guidelines on General Crimes, 
Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations § VI (May 30, 2002) (indicating that the 
FBI is permitted to obtain information for surveillance purposes “through services or resources (whether 
nonprofit or commercial) that compile or analyze such information; and information voluntarily provided 
by private entities”). 
102
 Solove, supra note 100, at 493-94; see also Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace 
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1260 (1998) (claiming that surveillance activities lead to self-
censorship).  Some may counter that consumers are not experiencing significant subjective privacy harm 
given that they do not seem to alter their online behavior in response to privacy concerns. But see supra 
notes 89-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.  Furthermore, it is difficult to prove that 
consumers do not alter their behavior in response to privacy concerns.  While many consumers continue to 
shop online, perhaps many more would if their privacy concerns were allayed, or even the ones that do 
shop would shop more.  Furthermore, consumers may find shopping online at, say, Amazon.com, relatively 
safe, while avoiding other less well-known sites.  Indeed, it seems more logical to conclude that if 
consumers repeatedly indicate that they are concerned with their information privacy, that they do alter 
their behavior in a variety of ways that, collectively, may be significant.   
103
 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., The Privacy Act of 1974, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/1974act/ (last 
visited July 27, 2012). 
104
 See Calo, supra note 85, at 1148. 
105
 See Calo, supra note 85 at 1147-52; Solove, supra note 100, at 532-48. 
106
 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., supra note 103. 
107
 For a recent example of one such media report that caused panic among consumers, see Perlroth & 
Bilton, supra note 76. 
108
 It may be argued that such types of people are precisely those who will diligently exercise control 
over their information, thereby limiting subjective privacy harm.  However, because of the Incognito and 
Onward Transfer Problems, even when exercising whatever choices they may have, in some cases such 
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for others it may be the cause of anxiety that results in undesirable distortions to their 
behavior.   
¶41  As more and more third parties have access to the consumer’s information, the 
likelihood of objective harm occurring also increases.  The more third parties that have 
the consumer’s information, the more likely it becomes that the consumer will receive 
unwanted contacts or be subjected to a harmful external action.  Though the current 
notice and choice regime may in the first instance help limit the likelihood of objective 
harm because consumers can prevent some disclosures if they are scrupulous,
109
 once 
information is disclosed to third parties, those third parties have no obligation, except in 
limited circumstances, to provide choice regarding how they will use and further disclose 
the consumer’s information.  Aside from failing to provide consumers with this 
secondary layer of notice and choice, such third parties may also use insufficient data 
security measures.
110
  Thus, once a consumer’s information is beyond the first set of 
limited hurdles, it is impossible to determine where that information may end up.  One of 
the destinations could very well be in the hands of persons that use it against the 
consumer in an objectively harmful manner.  Or, it could end up with third parties that 
employ lax data security standards, which itself increases the likelihood of objective 
privacy harm. 
C. A (Not-So) Hypothetical John Doe 
¶42  A thought experiment helps illustrate these types of privacy harms more clearly.  
Assume John Doe is a 30-year old male living in Palo Alto, California, working as an 
engineer for a start-up company.  The minute John wakes up, and until he goes to sleep, 
an army of information collectors takes notes of his movements, activities, and 
preferences.  These details are combined with other sources of data previously collected 
about John.  Some of this data collection is done with John’s “consent,” but even in those 
cases, John typically is not fully aware of the nature and extent of the collection, even in 
the few cases where he bothered to read through the collector’s notice about its practices 
(if provided).  Where he likes to eat, where he was throughout the day, his favorite 
hobbies, the types of books he reads,
111 
among other intimate details about John, are 
collected and stored into a comprehensive profile.   
 
consumers’ information will still be legitimately shared with unidentified third parties.  And once in those 
third parties’ hands, the consumer’s ability to control their information is mostly at an end.  
109
 But see supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text for reasons why most consumers are not 
scrupulous in protecting their information privacy.   
110
 It may be reasonable to believe that companies that legally receive information from consumers will 
put in place contracts with additional third parties with which they share their consumers’ information.  
Even if that is true in most cases, the point remains that in such scenarios consumers have no control over 
their information and must rely on a third party enforcing whatever contractual standards the initial third 
party is able to negotiate with the additional third parties.  
111
 California recently passed legislation that prohibits providers of book services from disclosing to 
government or private entities or persons certain personal information relating to users of book services, 
including information relating to the person’s reading preferences, subject to certain exceptions.  One of the 
exceptions occurs if users have given their consent to the specific disclosure for a particular purpose. See 
S.B. 602, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011); Elec. Frontier Found., Reader Privacy Act of 2011 (Apr. 5, 
2011), https://www.eff.org/cases/sb-602-californias-reader-privacy-act-2011.  However, arguably a general 
opt-in/opt-out choice would satisfy this requirement. Furthermore, this law only applies to California.   
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¶43  The data collectors then share his profile with third parties (through sale, license, or 
otherwise), who similarly may combine such data with preexisting sets of information 
they have about John.  Again, in some cases this sharing is done with John’s “consent,” 
although, again, even in cases of consent John does not know what specific third parties 
will receive his information, how specifically they will use it, and to which other third 
parties they may further disclose his information.  These third parties then use the 
information for their own purposes and similarly pass the information along to other third 
parties, who are under no direct obligations to John.
112
 
¶44  John is often oblivious to these information collectors and the other third parties 
that receive his information.  However, he increasingly hears stories about them and their 
activities, and this mere knowledge causes him some unease.  Often an information 
collector will approach him out of nowhere and offer him something.  Sometimes 
someone approaches him that he recognizes, but at other times he is completely 
unfamiliar with the person approaching him, and he wonders how that person knows his 
name or anything about him.  Sometimes these approaches are mere annoyances, and 
occasionally he is approached with something that actually interests him, but at other 
times the approach causes him real concern because of the nature of the party 
approaching him and the information they seem to possess about him.  As a result, John 
begins to alter his behavior.  He avoids some of his previously favorite haunts because he 
has experienced some of the more distressing encounters there.  He even begins to go out 




¶45  At some point a third party burglarizes John’s home.  The third party was able to 
case John’s home and successfully burglarize it through information it had obtained about 
him from the information market.  Later, a new website called “Consumerleaks,” styled 
after Wikileaks, posts some embarrassing information about him that causes John to lose 
his job.  Again, the information was obtained through the information market.   
¶46  The above examples describe much of what happens in the market today.114  
Whether it be through online browsing, shopping (online or offline), social networking, 
photo sharing, smartphones, geolocation tracking, WiFi hotspot data collection, or offline 
collection, companies constantly collect information about consumers, combine it with 
other sources into databases, and exchange it with third parties.
115
  And they often do 
these things with notice to consumers and the consumer’s “consent.”  In some cases 
consumers can simply choose not to use third party services or buy their goods and 
thereby avoid disclosing information to them, but in the modern world complete 
 
112
 Cf. Posner, supra note 83, at 247-49.  The hypothetical described here mirrors the reality of modern 
society as Posner describes it, even though Posner remains a privacy harm skeptic. 
113
 Some may argue that the analogy above fails because in the real world, these information collectors 
are typically simply technologies employed by third parties that lack a human face.  The examples above, 
with their human collectors, seem much more invasive and thus potentially overstate the harm.  This 
criticism may be relevant to subjective privacy harm. That is, if the shadowy information collectors were 
replaced with robots, tracked persons may feel less anxiety knowing that it is not another human being that 
is actively processing and using their data, at least in a personal way.  However, the subjective privacy 
harm still exists since the level of anxiety is strongly related to the possibility of objective privacy harm, 
which this criticism does nothing to undermine.  Consequently, both types of harm remain relevant.   
114
 See Posner, supra note 83, at 248. 
115
 See Solove, supra note 90, at 1047-09 (highlighting the extent to which companies create information 
dossiers of consumers). 
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abstinence is virtually impossible.
116
  In other cases, consumers may be able to opt-out of 
data sharing (or simply not opt-in).  But often the notice regarding data sharing is buried 
so deeply within a privacy notice, and in language so vague as to be meaningless, that the 
consumer has very little chance to avoid this result, especially if it is a service or good 
that the person wants or needs urgently.
117
   
¶47  A system of information collection and subsequent data exchange as described 
above would cause at least some people to experience unease and anxiety
118—subjective 
privacy harm—which could cause them to alter their behavior and thereby undermine 
personal autonomy.  Some, of course, argue that the anxiety caused is not significant 
enough to merit redress, and that the economic advantages of the free flow of information 
far outweigh any such harms,
119
 but at least two additional responses seem warranted: (1) 
while it is possible that for many people the information collection and third-party 
disclosures will not cause significant anxiety or lead to altered behavior, it seems clear 
that some do experience anxiety as a result, as all available surveys suggest, and (2) it is 
unclear why the default rules should allow companies to cause that anxiety, whatever the 
level may be and even if the number of people affected is only a minority of the 
population.
120
   
¶48  Posner and others offer economic justifications for the default rules being as they 
are: the benefits of the free flow of information outweigh the, in their view, unsubstantial 
privacy harms that consumers may experience.  However, the economic argument can 
also go the other way: economic activity, such as online shopping, may increase if 
consumers felt more secure with disclosing sensitive information into the data exchange 
ether.  Indeed, at least some studies suggest consumers place a significant economic 
value on privacy.
121
   
¶49  Aside from the subjective privacy harm, the objective privacy harm also seems 
clear.  The more information about John that companies collect and disburse to 
unidentified third parties, the more likely it becomes that the information will fall into the 
wrong hands and be used for reasons with which John does not agree.  Instances of such 
 
116
 See Posner, supra note 83, at 247-49. 
117
 Several provisions from J.CREW’s privacy notice illustrate this point: “When you supply your postal 
address, either when requesting a catalog or placing an order, you may receive catalogs by mail from us.  
We also occasionally make our postal list available for limited use by unaffiliated third parties . . . . We 
may also share your information, including, without limitation, your email address (but not your credit card 
information) with unaffiliated third parties that would enable them to contact you about products or 
services you may be interested in.”  See J.Crew Privacy Policy, J.CREW, 
http://www.jcrew.com/footer/privacy.jsp (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
118
 See sources cited supra note 88.   
119
 See, e.g., supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
120
 Indeed, laws against, say, armed robbery, are not wrong simply because a minority of the population 
is ever affected (thankfully).  I am not trying to equate subjective privacy harm with armed robbery, but the 
point is that simply because only some will experience some harm absent regulation is not good reason to 
rule out the regulation, especially if the harm can be addressed without significant negative impacts. 
121
 See, e.g., Janice Tsai, Serge Egelman, Lorrie Cranor, & Alessandro Acquisti, The Effect of Online 
Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, at 15–17 (2007), available at 
http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/57.pdf (indicating that consumers were willing to pay up to 4% 
more on average for products and services if they were certain that their information privacy was being 
protected).  See also, Turow, supra note 14, at 20–26 (study suggesting that consumers are concerned about 
information collection and distribution practices of companies, and in large part disfavor many of the 
standard tracking practices that companies employ today, including the “benefit” of targeted advertising).  
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misuses that cause significant harm such as identity theft may be far and few between, 
but they can and do happen, and increasingly so.
122
 
IV. THE PROPOSAL 
¶50  The realities of the current system are less than inspiring.  Except in a few limited 
cases,
123
 consumers remain without specific information about what third parties have 
their information, how such third parties will use it, and whether they might share it with 
additional third parties.  And once those additional third parties have the consumer’s 
information, they are almost entirely unaccountable to the consumer.
124
  Eventually, 
consumers may become aware of who, in fact, does have their information through an 
array of marketing or other contacts (in a worst case scenario identity theft), but they 
remain in the dark about how those third parties received their information in the first 
place and how they may otherwise use the information.  Furthermore, they have no legal 
means to force the third party to disgorge their information or prevent further disclosure.  
This scenario hardly inspires confidence. 
¶51  As a possible solution to the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems, this Article 
explores the possible benefits and potential drawbacks of a federal law that would require 
companies to provide notice and choice to consumers that describes the intended third 
party recipients and their uses, as well as providing consumers with a private right of 
action to protect their privacy interests under the law.  This examination is particularly 
relevant as Congress continues to explore privacy legislation addressing similar issues.
125
  
It is hoped that this exploration will provide some guidance on these and similar 
information privacy issues. 
A. Definitions 




 Instances of identity theft have been on the rise for years. See, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Identity Theft Reported by Households Rose 33 Percent from 2005 to 2010, 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/press/itrh0510pr.cfm (last updated Jul. 13, 2012).  This is not to say that all or 
even a majority of instances of identity theft originate with information that consumers have provided to 
companies.  However, at least some instances of identity theft may result from companies’ data security 
breaches, which become more likely the more information that companies store and exchange.  See Threat 
Activity Trends, SYMANTEC, 
http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/topic.jsp?id=threat_activity_trends&aid=data_breaches (last visited 
Jul. 13, 2012) (suggesting data breaches pose a significant risk of identity theft). 
123
 For instance, with respect to protected health information under HIPAA, see supra Part I.A. 
124
 Some laws may still impact such third parties depending on the third parties’ activities.  For instance, 
if the third party sends the consumer a “commercial email,” the CAN-SPAM Act would apply to the 
company, subjecting it to several requirements under the law.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n, CAN-SPAM Act: A 
Compliance Guide for Business (Sept. 2009), http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus61-can-spam-act-
compliance-guide-business/.  
125
 See sources cited supra note 15. 
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1. Personally Identifiable Information 
¶53  The proposed law should only apply to personally identifiable information (PII) 
that companies collect and propose to disclose to third parties, and not aggregate, 
anonymized information (non-PII).  It excludes the latter for several reasons.  First, it is 
not clear that third parties could easily use non-PII to cause consumers objective privacy 
harm.
126
  The possibility of re-identification may suggest that non-PII should be regulated 
in some manner.
127
  But because the risk of objective privacy harm is more remote with 




¶54  Second, although disclosures of non-PII could still result in some subjective 
privacy harm for consumers who are simply anxious about any sort of collection and 
disclosure, arguably this type of harm is unavoidable and results more from the extreme 
sensitivities of a few than a legitimate issue needing redress. Indeed, for subjective 
privacy harm to be legitimate, objective privacy harm must also be a strong possibility.  
Since with non-PII objective harm is less likely,
129
 arguably little rational subjective 
privacy harm exists in cases of non-PII disclosure.  This discussion also helps define non-
PII: information that cannot generally or easily be reverse engineered or otherwise linked 
back to individuals.   
¶55  What constitutes PII is not a straightforward issue.  For instance, the E.U. Directive 
defines “personal data” quite broadly, in a manner that may include information that a 
company would not be able to use to actually identify a person: 
'[P]ersonal data' shall mean any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can 
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
 
126
 Some have argued that true anonymization is impossible, so we should not treat non-PII any 
differently than PII.  See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).  Contra Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data 
Commons, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2011) (arguing that the risks of re-identifying previously anonymous 
information are much more remote than many believe, and that the examples Ohm used in his article were 
much more limited than his analysis suggested); see also Ann Cavoukian & Khaled El Emam, Dispelling 
the Myths Surrounding De-Identification: Anonymization Remains a Strong Tool for Protecting Privacy 
(June 2011), available at http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Dispelling%20the%20Myths%20Surrounding%20De-
identification%20Anonymization%20Remains%20a%20Strong%20Tool%20for%20Protecting%20Privacy
.pdf (arguing that the risks of re-identification are greatly overblown so long as companies take proper de-
identification precautions). 
127
 Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove recently articulated a concept of PII 2.0, under which they propose 
three different categories of information, each of which they believe the government should regulate 
differently.  Paul Schwartz & Daniel Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally 
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011).  Their categories are: information that refers to 
(1) an identified person, (2) an identifiable person, and (3) a non-identifiable person.  Id.  My proposed 
definition of PII would fall within their first category.  Under this Article’s proposal, their second category 
of information referring to an identifiable person would fall within my non-PII category since the risk of re-
identification for such information is minimal.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to address how such 
information should be regulated, if at all.  
128
 Id. Solove and Schwartz do in fact argue that the two should be regulated differently. Id. at 1877.   
129
 See Yakowitz, supra note 126.  
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number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity.
130
 
¶56  Under one interpretation of this definition, it may not even be necessary to be able 
to identify the person from the related information, so long as the information is related to 
an identifiable person in some way.  For purposes of this proposal and its intent—to 
address privacy harm—this definition is too broad.   
¶57  Other laws, such as the California Data Security Breach Act, define personal 
information as the name of an individual in combination with one of a number of other 
types of sensitive information (e.g., credit card number).
131
  For purposes of this proposal, 
this definition is too limited.  This type of definition seems primarily concerned with 
addressing certain forms of objective privacy harm (e.g., identity theft).  However, this 
proposal seeks to address all forms of objective privacy harm as well as limiting 
subjective privacy harm, since the presence of legitimate, reasonable subjective privacy 
harm increases the likelihood that objective privacy harm will follow.   
¶58  This proposal, therefore, takes a position in between these two extremes and 
defines PII similarly to how the U.S. Executive Branch has defined it: 
[I]nformation which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, 
such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when 
combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or 




¶59  This definition has the advantage of avoiding the excessive breadth of the E.U. 
definition, remaining consistent with how other important players in the U.S. already 
define PII, while achieving the definition’s primary goal: to limit the law’s application to 
that information that is linked or could readily be linked to an identifiable person.
133
  As 
scoped, the definition thus focuses the model law on the two forms of privacy harm 
discussed herein. 
2. Disclosure to Third Parties 
¶60  Not all PII disclosures to third parties should trigger the law’s application.  For 
instance, the law should not apply to government actors seeking PII as part of an 
investigation.  The standards of the Fourth Amendment and laws such as the Electronic 
 
130
 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 38. 
131
 James F. Brelsford, California Raises the Bar on Data Security and Privacy, FINDLAW (2003), 
available at http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Sep/30/133060.html.  
132
 Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management and 
Budget, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Safeguarding Against and Responding to 
the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information 1 n. 1  (May 22, 2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-16.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF INFO. OFFICER, Electronic Transmission of PII Policy, (Jul. 30, 2009), available at 
http://ocio.os.doc.gov/ITPolicyandPrograms/IT_Privacy/PROD01_008240#P46_1812.  
133
 See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 127, at 1829 (according with Solove and Schwartz’s first 
category of information regulation: the tautological approach). 
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Communications Privacy Act would apply in those cases.
134
  In the commercial context, 
if companies disclose PII to third parties that perform services solely on behalf of the 
company—and which do not use the PII for their own purposes or for purposes other than 
for which the information was originally collected—the law should not apply to that 
disclosure.
135
  The law should only apply if the company disclosed the PII to the third 
party for a secondary use of the information: a use beyond the purposes for which the 
individual provided the PII.
136
   
¶61  Consequently, if a consumer submitted PII to a company, and the submission was 
made for the purpose of disclosure to and use by specific third parties, then the law 
should not apply.  However, if a consumer submitted PII to a company for a specific 
purpose, and the company disclosed that information to a third party to process it solely 
on its behalf (i.e., not for the third party’s own use), but for a use other than the reason 
the consumer initially submitted the PII, then the law should apply. 
¶62  This limitation is important in order to avoid interrupting the flow of information 
necessary to achieve the consumer’s purposes in disclosing their PII in the first place.  
Hence, so long as the company discloses the PII in order to satisfy the consumer’s 
wishes, the law should not apply.  Once companies begin to disclose the PII for purposes 
other than the original purpose of disclosure, the law should apply. 
¶63  This definition helps address privacy harms in several ways.  First, subjective 
privacy harm would likely decrease since consumers would feel reassured that companies 
were only disclosing their PII for the consumer’s purposes, and not those of the company 
or unrelated third parties (unless notice and choice had been provided, as discussed 
below).  Second, objective privacy harm would likely decrease because fewer third 
parties would be PII recipients in this system.
137
 
B. The Mechanics 
¶64  The law would require the following elements: specific notice of intended third 
party recipients and their proposed uses prior to disclosure, choice, and a private right of 
action to enforce the law.  Each of these elements is discussed more fully below, 
including addressing common criticisms of each. 
 
134
 See generally SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 247–376, for an overview of such standards. 
135
 Whether the law would apply to subsidiaries and affiliates of a company is a difficult question.  For 
instance, a consumer disclosing information to Amazon.com, Inc. may be surprised to learn that 
Zappos.com is a wholly owned subsidiary of Amazon.com, Inc. and therefore may not expect their 
information to be in the hands of Zappos.com.  One approach might be to carve out affiliated companies 
from the law’s effects, similar to the GLBA.  However, doing so arguably violates the principle of no 
secondary uses, as well as still posing similar privacy harms.  Consequently, this proposal does not 
advocate such an approach.  Another approach might be simply to grant companies some additional leeway 
in how they share information with affiliated companies.  This proposal does not address such possibilities, 
and instead relies on the “no secondary use” principle discussed infra note 136 and accompanying text.  
136
 This limitation accords with generally accepted Fair Information Practice Principles. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 4. 
137
 This may not be the result if the notice and choice, as discussed below, proved to be as deficient as 
provided for in the current system, or if consumers simply elected to make their information as available as 
in the current system.  The latter result is consumers’ choice (though it seems unlikely), and the former 
only results if the proposal has fatal flaws. 




¶65  Currently only a few states require privacy notices by law.138  Although most major 
companies do develop and post privacy notices,
139
 they typically do so in order to protect 
themselves.  That is, companies’ privacy notices provide information in very general 
terms, and doing so technically puts consumers on notice and makes the company a 
“good citizen.”  However, as discussed throughout, this notice is severely deficient with 
respect to third-party disclosures.  An outright notice requirement with consumers in 
mind is thus important in order to provide consumers with an ability to control their 
information and thereby limit privacy harm.
140
  Consequently, the law should require 
each company that collects PII to present the consumer with notice of intended third party 
recipients of such PII and the third parties’ proposed uses.   
¶66  Notice, despite being a popular means of regulation,141 has many detractors.142  
Some of the most common criticisms include: information overload, time constraints in 
actually reading the notices, cognitive limitations in understanding them, and, even when 
taking the time to read and understand them—which most consumers do not—an 
inability to take action that would change the end result.
143
  
¶67  Others have argued that notice is inherently defective in the information privacy 
context because consumers lack the ability, based on these notices, to make accurate 
choices that reflect their privacy preferences given certain behavioral and decision-
 
138
 See supra Part I.C.i.  
139
 In the increasingly important world of mobile software applications, however, many companies do 
not provide privacy notices or choice, and it is unclear even in states that require online companies to post 
privacy policies, such as California, whether mobile application companies are required to. See, e.g., 
sources cited supra notes 47, 76. 
140
 Consumers sometimes mistake the existence of privacy notices as an indication that the company will 
adhere to certain privacy principles.  For instance, in a recent study in California, “Californians who shop 
online believe that privacy policies prohibit third-party information sharing.  A majority of Californians 
believes that privacy policies create the right to require a website to delete personal information upon 
request, a general right to sue for damages, a right to be informed of security breaches, a right to assistance 
if identity theft occurs, and a right to access and correct data.”  Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer King, 
Research Report: What Californians Understand About Privacy Online 2 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262130.  In reality, often the exact opposite is the 
case, e.g., a privacy policy gives the company an accepted basis for disclosing consumer information to 
third parties. 
141
 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 188-93 (2008); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a 
Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (2007). 
142
 M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1027, 1029-30 (2012) (hereinafter Against Notice Skepticism). 
143
 Id.; see also infra notes 6-14 and accompanying text; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRELIMINARY FTC 
STAFF REPORT: PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE at iii (2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (noting that the notice and choice model, as 
currently implemented, “has led to long, incomprehensible privacy policies that consumers do not read, let 
alone understand”); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 
I/S: J.L. POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 544 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/7550344/Cost-of-Reading-Privacy-Policies (noting that studies demonstrate 
that “privacy policies are hard to read, read infrequently, and do not support rational decision making”); 
and Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, IEEE 
SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 24, 24-30, available at 
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/weis2004/acquisti.pdf (concluding that consumers often lack enough information 
to make decisions that match their privacy preferences and, even when they do have sufficient information, 
are likely to make suboptimal decisions due to psychological deviations from rationality).   
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making limitations and inherent biases.
144
  According to this line of argument, therefore, 
no matter how notice is implemented, consumers will typically fail to make decisions that 
align with their actual preferences.
145
  As a result, notice and its counterpart, choice, are 
ruled out as possible means to preventing privacy harms; only substantive privacy 
controls will do.
146
   
¶68  If notice is to be a part of an effective remedy for privacy harm, these criticisms 
must be addressed.  These criticisms can be generally categorized in a series of things 
consumers don’t do.  Consumers don’t (1) read the notices, (2) understand the notices, (3) 
have time to do either (1) or (2), (4) make choices consistent with their privacy 
preferences, (5) have the ability to affect privacy outcomes, and (6) care about privacy 
notices or privacy in general. 
¶69  Arguably all of these sources of notice deficiency are addressable in some measure.  
For instance, while policymakers cannot force a consumer to pay attention to a privacy 
notice, they can make it more likely that they will do so by requiring notices to be 
accessible and in a format that more interests the consumer.
147
  Similarly, a notice can be 
less time-consuming to review and easier to understand if it is simplified and presents a 
clear message.
148
  Apathy about notice may not be completely solvable,
149
 but making 
notices more accessible and easier to understand may eliminate at least some consumers’ 
apathy.  Furthermore, at least some apathy may stem from consumers feeling that they 
cannot affect the outcome.  Choice, as described below, may help address this source of 
notice apathy.   
¶70  Providing consumers with details regarding who specifically will receive their 
information and for what specific purposes arguably helps address many of these 
concerns.  A list of specific third parties would be easier for consumers to understand—
and more relevant—than general categories of the types of third parties with which a 
company may share the consumers’ information.  Because such a list would be easier to 
understand, it may also take less time to review.
150
  And it seems more likely that a 
 
144
 See Nehf, supra note 13, at 1734-43 (identifying many issues with the notice-and-choice regime, 
including lack of transparency, consumers’ difficulty in valuing privacy, an inability to assess risks or make 
accurate choices because of competing goals, and behavioral heuristics, such as drawing false inferences, 
that lead to suboptimal decisions); Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 143; McDonald & Cranor, supra note 
143. 
145
 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 143; Nehf, supra note 13. 
146
 See Nehf, supra note 13, at 1145; see also Failure of Fair Information, supra note 6 (advocating 
adoption of substantive restrictions on data processing in order to prevent specific privacy harms).  
147
 For a recent study suggesting that the standardization and simplification of privacy policy forms 
leads to greater consumer ease of use and enjoyment, see PATRICK GAGE KELLEY ET AL., STANDARDIZING 
PRIVACY NOTICES: AN ONLINE STUDY OF THE NUTRITION LABEL APPROACH (Jan. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab09014.pdf.  
148
 Id.; see also NATHANIEL GOOD ET AL., STOPPING SPYWARE AT THE GATE: A USER STUDY OF 
PRIVACY, NOTICE AND SPYWARE 7 (2005), available at 
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~jensg/research/paper/grossklags-spyware_study.pdf (noting that in an 
experiment where users were provided with shorter notices, participants generally reacted very favorably to 
such notices and could recall specific content from the notices).   
149
 See, e.g., HUMPHREY TAYLOR, MOST PEOPLE ARE “PRIVACY PRAGMATISTS” WHO, WHILE 
CONCERNED ABOUT PRIVACY, WILL SOMETIMES TRADE IT OFF FOR OTHER BENEFITS (Mar. 19, 2003), 
available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Most-People-Are-
Privacy-Pragmatists-Who-While-Conc-2003-03.pdf (identifying, based on polling, a category of people 
who simply do not care about privacy). 
150
 If the list is incredibly long, of course, it may take longer for the consumer to review than reading a 
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consumer would in fact review the list given how relevant the information is.  If all of 
these hold true, then consumer apathy might also decrease, especially if the consumer is 
clearly able to affect the outcome, which under this proposal would be the case. 
¶71  Furthermore, people in other contexts frequently make choices based on imperfect 
information about risks, and they are subject to similar behavioral and decision-making 
limitations and biases that lead to suboptimal choices.
151
  But this does not mean that 
substantive controls should replace notice and choice in those contexts.  For instance, in 
the food industry, many food products are unhealthy and can contribute to serious health 
conditions and even, ultimately, death.  Even apparently healthy foods can have unknown 
negative consequences.
152
  Consumers have some notice and understanding of these 
issues, but even the most skilled food scientists do not fully understand the science of 
food and its effects on humans.  As in the consumer privacy context, then, perfect notice 
about the consequences of food choices is difficult if not impossible.
153
  And even with 
what information is available, consumers still may not act rationally in making food 
choices.  As a result, consumers frequently make choices about food based on imperfect 




¶72  Despite this, Congress has not enacted general laws mandating a certain type of 
diet or prohibiting foods with little or no health benefits.
155
  Nor would society likely 
countenance it: such laws, even if in Americans’ general best interest, would violate 
significant values underlying U.S. society, such as personal autonomy and freedom of 
choice.  Instead, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires labeling that specifies 
health information about food products
156
 and generally regulates food companies in 
 
few sentences that describe general categories of third parties and their uses.  There will always be 
tradeoffs.  Arguably in a case where a company includes a long list that takes more time to go through, the 
consumer would be more willing to do so precisely because the information is relevant and actionable 
based on the choice principle described below. 
151
 See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS (Stanford University Press, 1983). 
152
 See, e.g., WebMD, Not-So-Healthy ‘Health Foods’: Some Foods You Think are Good for You May 
Not be All they Seem, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/food-recipes/features/not-so-healthy-health-foods 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2012).  
153
 The reasons for imperfect notice may differ in the two contexts, of course. In the food context, 
imperfect notice may be the result of imperfect food science, whereas in the consumer privacy context the 
imperfect notice may be the result of poor implementation.  Arguably, however, all possible 
implementations will include some imperfections simply because the solution must apply to all consumers, 
and different consumers have different preferences regarding how they receive notice.  
154
 One might argue that the consumer food product and consumer privacy contexts differ in material 
ways, and thus the comparison above is flawed.  For instance, in the food product context, the consumer 
does derive some benefit from his suboptimal choices, even if the long-term the effects are negative.  One 
might argue that in the consumer privacy context, there is no such benefit to the consumer, only to the 
company, and thus substantive controls are merited in the one but not the other.  But this view seems overly 
cynical.  Consumers may benefit in the form of more relevant advertisements, cheaper products, and faster 
service as a result of information sharing. 
155
 Federal and state legislative bodies have enacted laws regulating the types of foods schools offer to 
children. See, e.g., Todd Zwillich, Congress Weighs School Junk Food Laws, WEBMD (Mar. 6, 2007), 
http://www.webmd.com/parenting/news/20070306/congress-weighs-school-junk-food-laws (“[T]he federal 
government already regulates the nutritional content of breakfasts and lunches served in public school 
cafeterias.”); Anahad O’Connor, Bans on School Junk Food Pay Off in California, NY TIMES (May 8, 
2012, 12:02 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/bans-on-school-junk-food-pay-off-in-
california/ (discussing the results of two laws passed in California aimed at curbing consumption of junk 
food at school). 
156
 See generally U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Food Labeling and Nutrition Overview, 
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order to minimize misleading or deceptive labeling.
157
  Cumulatively, such measures aim 
to help provide consumers with better notice about the food products’ merits and 
demerits before making choices.  They do not, of course, provide perfect information, 
and consumers still make suboptimal choices in many cases (and still would even with 
perfect information).  But they do provide consumers with some aids in making food 
choices, when and if done well.
158
   
¶73  As this Article argues, improving notice with respect to third-party disclosures can 
similarly help consumers address the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems and 
thereby limit privacy harms.  Of course, any proposed remedy need not fully solve for 
any of these issues, nor can it.  Some consumers, no matter how the notice is 
implemented, will simply not care.  Or, even if they do, they will choose not to read the 
notice, exercise their choices, or make choices that match their privacy preferences.
159
  
The purpose of the proposal is not to prevent privacy harms in all cases—a virtual 
impossibility—but to provide consumers with an enhanced means to limit such harms 
with respect to the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems. 
¶74  Exactly how the notice is implemented is vital.  After all, if companies bury notice 
and choice regarding third-party disclosures in a remote corner (virtual or otherwise), 
surrounded by reams of additional legal language, then the proposed regime may be no 
better than the current one.  Even so, preferably the law would only specify the 
substantive goal to be achieved without dictating the exact implementation in each case.  
Such “command-and-control” regulations have often proved counterproductive in other 
contexts, and allowing industry to help identify the best ways to implement the policy 
(while preserving the substance of the policy goal) seems like the best way forward, both 
in terms of costs and effectiveness.
160
   
 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/default.htm (last updated Mar. 23, 2011). 
157
 For background on FDA regulatory activities with respect to food labeling and companies’ 
misleading and deceptive labeling practices, see A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, United States 
Food Law Update: The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Obesity and Deceptive Labeling 
Enforcement¸7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 135, 149-62 (2011). Note that the FTC also plays a role in regulating 
companies when it concerns food advertising, which is technically different from food labeling.  
158
 Some recent reports suggest recent changes to food labeling requirements have in fact aided 
consumers in making healthier food choices.  See, e.g., David Morgan, New York Study Says Menu 
Labeling Affects Behavior, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2009, 3:57 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/26/us-obesity-newyork-idUSTRE59P4O720091026 (indicating 
that laws requiring calories to be listed have in fact led to consumers choosing foods with fewer calories); 
COMMUNITY RES. & DEV. INFO. SERVICE, Nutrition Labeling: Not as Effective as You Might Think, (Feb. 
20, 2012) http://cordis.europa.eu/fetch?CALLER=EN_NEWS&ACTION=D&SESSION=&RCN=34314 
(summarizing a recent study in Europe suggesting consumers do rely on labels in making food choices, 
while also noting that consumers often lack motivation to thoroughly study labels due to a lack of health 
goals). 
159
 See Nutrition Labeling: Not as Effective as You Might Think, supra note 156 (noting that one reason 
consumers failed to engage food labels is because they may lack health goals and, thus, may not take their 
health seriously). 
160
 For an interesting perspective on the development of environmental regulation through the joint 
efforts of industry and regulators, and how such development may prove instructive to privacy regulation’s 
development, see Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can 
Learn From Environmental Law, 41 G. L. REV. 1 (2006); see also Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by 
Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1409, 1445 (2011) (arguing that prescriptive regulation and self-
regulation are not mutually exclusive, and that co-regulatory alternatives may be especially viable in the 
privacy realm). 
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¶75  One simple mechanism for providing notice would be for companies to provide a 
list of intended third-party recipients, followed by a short description of the intended use 
for each.  It may even be preferable to have the third-party disclosure list separate from 
notice of other privacy practices so as to facilitate access and understanding.  Ideally the 
list would be just that: a list, with at most a short blurb from the company permitted 
making its pitch for why consumers should let the company share their PII.   
¶76  With respect to the short descriptions following the identified third parties, the FTC 
could play a role in developing a list of typical uses that companies select from in 
building their lists.  Ideally the FTC would work in conjunction with industry in order to 
develop the most relevant descriptions.  This would have the benefit of harmonizing 
language among companies so that disparate practices do not lead to consumer confusion.  
Including industry in the discussion would also help ensure that the regulation is as 
relevant as possible, thereby minimizing compliance costs.   
¶77  In terms of timing, the company should present the list to the consumer before the 
company begins sharing the consumer’s PII with third parties.  However, companies 
might choose a number of different methods of providing the notice—for instance, 
through e-mail, click-through, text message, or traditional mail—so long as the company 
actually presents the notice to the consumer.  Merely posting the notice somewhere 
(online or offline) should not be sufficient.
161
  If a company wants to add additional third 
parties to the list after it gives the initial notice, the law should require it to provide the 
consumer with additional notice and choice before doing so.
162
   
¶78  Note that the law should also cover companies that initially received the PII from 
other companies rather than directly from the consumer.  That is, if a company received 
the PII legally from another third party, but then desired to further disclose it to another 
third party, it would need to provide the consumer with notice and choice before doing 
so.
163
  This would address the Onward Transfer Problem. 
¶79  One complication naturally arises with this additional required notice: if the 
company has no means by which to contact the person—the PII the company received 
does not include contact information or such information is out-of-date, for instance—
then the company has no means by which to provide the notice.
164
  However, rather than 
 
161
 Some consumers may find the proposed notice an annoyance that in certain cases slows a transaction 
depending on how a company presents the list.  For instance, in an offline collection scenario, if a company 
chose to present the list to a hurried consumer at checkout, this may prove cumbersome.  Indeed, one only 
need contemplate each customer in a grocery store line going through such a list before checkout to feel 
repulsed by the idea.  However, companies would likely adopt more palatable methods of adhering to the 
law’s requirements, for instance, by following up an in-store visit with an email communication or text 
message, since doing so would be in their best interests.   
162
 The prospect of consumers constantly being bombarded with e-mails and other messages from 
companies asking permission to disclose their information to additional third parties may lessen the appeal 
of such a law.  However, the net effect of the law could be that consumers actually receive far fewer 
messages from companies if they have declined companies’ requests to share their information in the first 
place.  Furthermore, if a consumer is averse to ever sharing their information with third parties, the law 
could require that companies simply provide consumers with a choice that declines permissions to share 
their information in perpetuity.  
163
 The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits state departments of motor vehicles from 
disclosing driver records to third parties without affirmative consent of the driver, addresses the Onward 
Transfer Problem in the same manner, i.e., by requiring driver consent to further disseminations of their 
personal information.  See Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c) (2006).   
164
 One unintended consequence of the law might be that companies end up collecting more PII than 
they otherwise would, precisely in order to be able to provide consumers with the required notice.  For 
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have the default favor industry, this proposal contends that the default should instead 
favor consumers by allowing them to limit possible privacy harms resulting from the 
Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems. 
2. Choice 
¶80  Choice is notice’s natural counterpart and is, consequently, subject to many of the 
same criticisms.
165
  But choice also has independent detractors.  For instance, some argue 
that additional regulation around obtaining consumer consent would lead to additional 
business costs for only marginal benefits at best.
166
  In some cases, seeking consent may 
raise the cost of goods and services as well as limit consumer choice due to companies’ 
inability to obtain such consent.
167
  In other cases such costs may undermine certain 
business models and make offering goods and services that consumers want unviable.
168
  
For instance, much of the freely accessible online world relies on advertising revenues, 
which choice and limitations on information sharing may negatively impact.
169
  Such 
regulations may also overly burden small, innovative companies and therefore raise 
barriers to entry.
170
   
¶81  These considerations are mitigated by several factors.  Some consumer information 
that companies rely on is non-PII, and non-PII is excluded from the proposed framework.  
One may also reasonably question the business cost claims underlying such arguments.  
Some studies suggest, for instance, that business studies of privacy costs are biased and 
incomplete.
171
  Many of these costs assume that new ways of marketing to consumers 
 
instance, under the law’s definition of PII, a static IP address would be covered, but that, along with data 
about the consumer’s web surfing habits, would not allow the company to easily contact the consumer 
through traditional means.  So a company placing cookies on a computer may also seek to collect an e-mail 
address or other contact information.  However, the actual consequence of this requirement might be that a 
company wanting to place cookies on a consumer’s computer would notify the consumer of the use of 
cookies (many websites already do this), followed by the notice with the third-party list.  Such issues are 
exactly why it would be vital to include the industry in addressing how best to implement the notice 
requirement, while preserving the substance of the goal.  
165
 I will not rehash those criticisms and my counters to them here, but instead refer the reader to Part 
II.B.1. 
166
 Failure of Fair Information, supra note 6, at 364-65 (detailing costs that companies incur in seeking 
consumer consent to the company’s data handling practices); and Staten & Cate, supra note 12 (arguing 
that requiring companies to provide consumers with an opt-in choice, which is a less invasive approach 
than what this Article proposes, would likely undermine certain business models by imposing huge costs on 
such companies). 
167
 See Financial Privacy and Consumer Protection: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
& Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 10 (statement of Fred H. Cate, Professor of Law, Indiana University School 
of Law) (quoting Bill Pryor, Protecting Privacy: Some First Principles, Remarks at the American Council 




 Rubinstein, supra note 73, at 413 (stating that privacy legislation may have negative economic 
impacts on “the online advertising revenues that currently subsidize free online content and services,” and 
that advocates of privacy regulation must recognize “that a drop in these revenues [may] result in higher 
costs for consumers”). 
170
 Robert E. Litan, Balancing Costs and Benefits of New Privacy Mandates 11 (AEI-Brookings Joint 
Ctr. for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 99-3, 1999). 
171
 Robert Gellman, Privacy, Consumers, and Costs: How The Lack of Privacy Costs Consumers and 
Why Business Studies of Privacy Costs are Biased and Incomplete, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER 
(Mar. 2002), http://epic.org/reports/dmfprivacy.html.  
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will not materialize or succeed; only old business models will do.
172
  In reality, the lack 
of information privacy itself may cost companies significant amounts of money since 
many consumers choose not to use online services based on privacy concerns.
173
  
Furthermore, the frequent justification of “consumer benefit” is overstated; in many 
cases, such as junk mail and repeated solicitations, it is almost certainly a consumer 
detriment instead.
174
   
¶82  Several of the arguments above are also based on some amount of privacy harm 
skepticism.  However, as this Article has argued, distinct privacy harms can and do result 
from the current system of notice.  Simply because consumers continue to participate in 
the commercial should not be read as evidence that they avoid privacy harm or that they 
are indifferent to it.
175
   
¶83  Choice—real choice—with respect to third-party disclosures also provides a useful 
barometer by which to measure consumer attitudes about privacy harm.  If a majority of 
consumers exercise their choice against disclosure to third parties, it suggests that we 
should be skeptical of privacy harm skepticism.  It might be argued that providing that 
choice inherently suggests to the mind of consumers privacy harm, and thus biases their 
choice in favor of prohibiting disclosure.  However, it is unclear why this would 
inherently be so.  It is certainly possible, and even likely, as argued throughout this 
Article and suggested by seemingly all relevant consumer surveys, that consumers are 
worried about privacy harms.  Furthermore, if it were the case that notice and choice 
somehow biased the consumer’s choice in a manner that failed to provide any real 
benefits, the remedy would be to improve the notice and choice, if possible, rather than 
eliminating notice and choice altogether.   
¶84  Consumers should thus have a choice as to whether the company may disclose their 
PII to specific third parties.  Companies could allow consumers to consent to part of the 
third-party list (e.g., by allowing the consumer to specifically indicate which third parties 
are permitted and which are not) or present it as an all-or-nothing proposition; leaving 
this issue to the company’s discretion would seem most advisable.  This Article 
recommends an opt-in mechanism in order to avoid incentivizing companies to make it 
difficult for consumers to opt-out.
176
  Consumers should also be able to revoke consent, 
though that revocation should not apply retroactively. 
¶85  If companies wish to disclose a consumer’s PII to additional third parties not listed 
in the initial notice, then, as mentioned with respect to notice, the company should be 
required to provide the consumer with additional notice and choice regarding whether the 
company may disclose the consumer’s PII to such third parties.  The company should be 
required to provide the consumer with a reasonable means by which to respond to the 
notice (e.g., real-time, e-mail, regular mail, or telephone). 
¶86  As with notice, often companies may not have contact information for the persons 







 Id. (indicating, for instance, that consumers spend more than $400 million dollars per year for 
privacy-protecting services for telephones). 
175
 See supra Part II. 
176
 See Ted Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the 
Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1230-32, 1241 (2002) (arguing against opt-out because 
such a default “creates incentives for privacy notices that lead to inaction by the consumer”). 
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may not respond.  However, this proposal contends that, in order to provide consumers 
with some ability to limit privacy harms, this should remain the company’s issue rather 
than becoming the consumer’s problem. 
3. Private Right of Action 
¶87  Under the current U.S. privacy regime, in most cases consumers have no means by 
which to enforce privacy statutes or hold companies accountable that fail to live up to any 
best practices to which they purport to adhere.
177
  Instead, in most cases consumers must 
rely on the limited resources of the FTC and state attorney generals to keep companies 
honest.  Or, they must simply rely on companies’ own goodwill.178   
¶88  To address this deficit, a model law should include a consumer private right of 
action.  Statutory damages for grossly negligent or willful violations might also be 
included, at levels significant enough to make companies wary of failing to comply.
179
  If 
a company illegally obtained someone’s PII and did not use it in a manner that would be 
immediately obvious to the consumer (e.g., direct marketing), then a consumer’s ability 
to enforce the law against such entity would obviously be limited.  However, because the 
consumer could enforce the law against any entity that did ultimately contact a consumer, 
companies anywhere along the chain of information distribution would be wary of 
accepting consumer PII if a company along that chain could not demonstrate to the other 
party that it had legally obtained the consumer’s PII.  In addition to the consumer’s 
private right of action, the FTC and state attorneys general would have the ability to 
enforce the law. 
¶89  Some have argued against a private right of action in privacy statutes, contending 
that plaintiff attorneys tend to abuse such laws by bringing class action suits for technical 
violations.
180
  Typically the attorneys receive a significant amount in the form of 
attorney’s fees, while class members end up receiving little compensation.181   
 
177
 One exception may be if the company makes certain promises in its privacy policy, that privacy 
policy is deemed to be part of a contract with the consumer.  If the company subsequently breaches that 
contract, the consumer may be able to successfully bring a breach of contract claim.  However, damages 
would be limited to contract remedies—economic damages directly resulting from the breach —without 
any statutory relief. See supra Part I.C.2 for additional discussion of this issue. 
178
 Another exception is FCRA, which provides a private right of action. See supra Part I.A. 
179
 Whether to include statutory damages, and determining the standard by which they should be 
triggered (i.e., negligence, willfulness, proof of actual damages, or something else), needs careful 
consideration.  For instance, in Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004), the majority opinion held that the text of 
the Privacy Act of 1974 precludes statutory damages unless the plaintiffs can show actual damages.  As the 
dissent pointed out, showing actual damages for privacy violations is often difficult.  So if proving actual 
damages is required in order to obtain statutory relief, the private right of action under the Privacy Act of 
1974 may be toothless.  Similarly, in Andrews v. Veterans Administration, 838 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1988), 
the court held that, although a federal agency was negligent in disclosing certain information about nurses 
to third parties, the nurses were not entitled to damages since the standard for obtaining damages was 
“intentional” or “willful” disclosure. Hence, ironically the Privacy Act of 1974 protects negligent or even 
grossly negligent disclosure of private information.    
180
 Ronald L. Plesser & Stuart P. Ingis, Limiting Private Rights of Action In Privacy Legislation, CTR, 
FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (Jul. 23, 2007), http://old.cdt.org/privacy/ccp/privaterightofaction1.shtml; see 
also Eric Goldman, The Irony of Privacy Class Action Litigation, 10 J. TELECOMM. & H. TECH. L. (2012) 
(arguing against allowing class action lawsuits as enforcement mechanisms in privacy statutes).  
181
 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 890-91. 
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¶90  Underlying these arguments, of course, is some amount of privacy harm 
skepticism.  This Article has shown, however, that the Incognito and Onward Transfer 
Problems cause both subjective and objective privacy harms.  Furthermore, class action 
abuse is a problem with class action suits in general, not specifically to suits involving 
privacy harm claims.  While reform in that domain may be warranted, that fact alone 
should not eliminate the possibility of a private right of action under a federal privacy 
statute.  As some have suggested, it may be advisable to simply prohibit class action suits 
as part of privacy statutes.
182
  But providing for a private right of action in the first place 
creates strong incentives for companies to take the regulation seriously.
183
  Given that the 
law’s requirements are clear and specific, complying with the law should also be within 
every company’s grasp. 
4. Relationship to Other Laws 
¶91  The proposed law should only affect Federal sectoral laws to the extent that its 
provisions impose more rigorous standards on companies.  Other aspects of such laws, 
such as the Safeguards Rule of GLBA and the Security Rule of HIPAA, should remain 
unaffected.  The proposed law should also not preempt state law, so states could choose 
to impose stricter requirements and continue to experiment with different forms of 
possibly more effective regulation.
184
 
V. AN ANALYSIS 
¶92  Ultimately whether to adopt the some such solution to the Incognito and Onward 
Transfer Problems is a normative question.  As Professor Larry Lessig has argued in the 
online context, the architecture of the Internet is largely what we decide it to be.
185
  
Similarly, with information privacy, we must choose if and to what extent we want to 
preserve information privacy based on what we value.
186
   
¶93  The current U.S. piecemeal regime to information privacy favors commercial 
values above all others.
187
  And some believe this focus on commercial interests is as it 
should be.  As many commentators have argued, this commercialization of information 
 
182
 See generally Goldman, supra note 180; see also Doe, 540 U.S. at 636 (Ginsburg, Stevens, & Breyer, 
JJ., dissenting) (arguing that courts can simply deny class certification if worried about runaway costs).  
183
 See Joshua D.W. Collins, Toothless HIPAA: Searching for a Private Right of Action to Remedy 
Privacy Rule Violations, 60 VAND. L. REV. 199, 202-03 (2007) (arguing that HIPAA and its privacy 
protections are “toothless” absent a private right of action); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search 
of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 878 (2003) (arguing that the lack of a private right of action in many 
privacy statutes leaves a significant enforcement gap); A. Michael Froomkin, Government Data Breaches, 
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1019, 1033-34 (2009) (noting that the Privacy Act of 1974, which applies to the 
government, includes a private right of action, thereby providing the law with “some teeth”).   
184
 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Reno v. Condon that Congress can regulate PII under the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).  Although Congress could preempt state 
laws on the basis of this decision, this Article argues that allowing states to experiment in privacy 
regulation may lead to improvements from which Congress could learn.  
185
 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, 32-37 (Basic Books, 2006), available at 
http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf. 
186
 Id. at 33-34.  
187
 Id. at 203-22 (describing generally how consumer privacy on the Internet has been sacrificed in favor 
of commercial interests). 
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provides significant benefits to consumers.
188
  Impeding this commercialization through 
regulation would, therefore, harm companies and consumers alike.
189
   
¶94  But, as this Article has argued, the commercialization of information also harms 
consumers.
190
  And it is unclear that this need be so.  Indeed, it may be that consumers 
will happily trade their information privacy for improved access to products and services.  
But they have never had a real choice.
191
  This Article’s proposal aims at improving that 
choice by addressing the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems.  Doing so, in turn, 
allows consumers to answer the normative question with respect to their information 
privacy and third-party disclosures. 
A. The Costs 
¶95  The proposed law would certainly impose some compliance costs on companies.192  
In some cases companies may need to rework their information technology systems in 
order to manage consumer information in accordance with the law.  In other cases 
companies may need to spend significant time and costs determining what third parties 
have access to their consumer information.  Arguably, however, forcing companies to 
manage consumer information more responsibly is a positive result.  Furthermore, a co-
regulatory approach that involves both industry and government in developing the 
solution would help minimize such compliance costs.
193
  In general, precise laws that 
give clear notice to industry of what is expected keep compliance costs at a minimum,
194
 
and the model law would do just that.   
¶96  Arguably the more serious costs would result if companies were unable to operate, 
offer goods and services at reasonable prices, or reach customers with their products and 
services because of the law.  A fettered online world subject to frequent tolls, for 
instance, may be one bad outcome of such a law.  But if certain business models really do 
depend on unfettered exchanges of PII, consumers can always allow companies to share 
their PII if they value commercial interests over their privacy interests.  If they do not, 
then arguably the law reaches the right result.  Indeed, arguing that the law harms 
consumers often assumes needs on the part of consumers that may not exist.
195
 
¶97  These counterpoints assume, of course, that consumers understand the role their PII 
plays in helping fund the commercial world.  They may, for instance, naively prohibit 
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companies from disclosing their PII to third parties, without understanding such a 
decision’s true impact on what companies are able to offer them.  But even this scenario 
is a positive result.  In such a case, companies would have a strong incentive to better 
educate consumers about how they use their information and why they need it.  Rather 
than simply attempting to do the legal bare minimum, therefore, companies would have 
incentives to do their utmost to give consumers clear information about their information 
handling practices.  Companies may develop novel and more effective ways of educating 
consumers about information privacy as a result. 
¶98  Another issue worth considering is that of free riders.  If most consumers are 
“privacy pragmatists” and trade some amount of their information privacy for economic 
benefits, and these decisions, collectively, allow companies to offer cheaper goods and 
services, then such privacy pragmatists may be subsidizing the privacy preferences of 
others such as “privacy fundamentalists.”196  That is, such privacy fundamentalists can 
have their cake (control their information) and eat it, too (access to cheaper and improved 
products and services).  We might view that result as unfair to privacy pragmatists, who 
are also concerned about information privacy generally.   
¶99  But looking at the collective result ignores the fact that privacy pragmatists, at the 
individual level, were willing to concede some amount of information privacy for 
whatever benefits the company offered them in return.  And they may be receiving 
greater benefits based on this tradeoff than the privacy fundamentalist does in general, 
such as access to exclusive offers or tailored marketing.  Indeed, it is unlikely that 
privacy pragmatists would give up their information privacy based on notions of 
collective good. 
B. The Constitution 
¶100  Aside from the economic considerations, another possible problem with the law is 
that it may be unconstitutional because it unduly burdens free speech.  Eugene Volokh 
has argued that information privacy rules such as those proposed in this Article likely 
violate the First Amendment.
197
  The U.S. Supreme Court also recently ruled in Sorrell v. 
IMS Health, Inc. that a Vermont statute violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free 
speech because it prohibited, absent consent, the use and dissemination of information 
relating to doctors’ prescription practices in various marketing activities.198   
¶101  However, in the instant case, the constitutional concerns seem manageable.  In 
Sorrell, the Court struck down the law because it included content- and speaker-based 
restrictions without compelling justifications for such restrictions: the law exclusively 
targeted marketing speech, and “more than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, 
namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”199  Given such restrictions, the Court applied 
heightened scrutiny and found the State’s justifications of maintaining medical privacy 
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and improving public health unconvincing.
200
  With regard to the medical privacy 
justification, the Court noted that almost anyone other than marketers could access and 
use the information; a more compelling implementation, according to the Court, would 
have been to limit use and dissemination of the information in all cases except for a few 
narrowly defined ones.
201
   
¶102  The proposed law is therefore distinguishable from the Vermont statute in Sorrell, 
in that the “speech”202 regulated here does not include similar content- and speaker-based 
restrictions as the Vermont statute.  Indeed, the proposed law is akin to a HIPAA-type 
regulation, which the Court referenced with approval, where use and disclosure is broadly 
prohibited except in certain narrowly defined cases.
203
  This may seem ironic since such 
an outcome means broader prohibitions on speech, but the Court in Sorrell was primarily 
concerned that the Vermont statute singled out specific speakers and a specific viewpoint.  
The proposed law does no such thing.
204
 
C. The Alternatives 
¶103  Others have argued that legislation is not feasible given the industry lobby against 
such regulation, and have thus proposed reliance on the judiciary to develop relevant 
privacy torts instead.
205
  While it is true that Congress has not yet enacted a privacy bill, 
and that industry certainly prefers a self-regulation model, Congress continues to propose 
new consumer privacy-related bills.
206
  Therefore, exploring the ideal tenets of such a law 
remains pertinent.  Furthermore, this proposal is not meant to rule out other possible 
solutions to different pieces of the information privacy conundrum.   
¶104  Indeed, the proposed law would not be a total solution to problems that exist with 
the current piecemeal information privacy regime.  Instead, this Article focuses on the 
Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems.  This focus is merited given the significant 
privacy harms that can and do result on the basis of largely unregulated third-party 
disclosures.  However, other privacy harms may also result from lax information security, 
online tracking (even without disclosure to third parties), among others.  Similar types of 
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notice and choice as proposed here may not be appropriate in such contexts,
207
 and 
substantive privacy controls may be warranted in others.  “Privacy by design” and 
“privacy enhancing technologies” (“PETs”) have also received significant attention more 
recently as possible pieces of the puzzle.
208
  Such issues are outside the scope of this 
Article.  What seems clear is that no one-size-fits-all approach to information privacy and 
security is sufficient. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶105  Consumers face significant obstacles in protecting their information privacy in the 
modern commercial world.  This Article has identified two obstacles that significantly 
limit consumers’ ability to control their information privacy fate: the Incognito and 
Onward Transfer Problems.  The U.S. piecemeal approach to information privacy has 
failed to fill these gaps, and current legislative proposals similarly leave them gaping.
209
   
¶106  Do consumers care? Surveys suggest they do.210  But it is hard to say without 
giving consumers a chance to decide.  Consumers may very well favor commercial 
interests over privacy interests.  Yet to claim this is already clear based on consumer 
behavior assumes that the current piecemeal privacy regime does an adequate job of 
providing consumers with the ability to control their information privacy.  The Incognito 
and Onward Transfer Problems suggest this is clearly not the case with respect to third-
party disclosures.  And loosely regulated third-party disclosures are a major piece of the 
information privacy puzzle.   
¶107  But clearly other information privacy problems exist.  Discussions of consumer 
tracking, for instance, have dominated much information privacy discourse over the past 
few years.
211
  Even though this Article’s proposal would prevent tracking companies 
from sharing consumer PII dossiers with third parties absent specific consumer notice and 
consent, it does nothing about the tracking in the first place.  And some consumers—
rightfully so—may still worry about such tracking.  Certainly subjective and objective 
privacy harms may result from such activities. 
¶108  One lesson from this study is that an effective solution to consumer privacy issues 
requires that the different problems be isolated and addressed separately.  The days of a 
global privacy notice giving companies license to do whatever they would like with 
consumer PII, so long as they follow whatever tenets they’ve buried in that notice, should 
be numbered.  Fair Information Practice Principles are not, or should not be considered, 
information privacy gospel.  For some problems, notice and choice is almost certainly not 
the right solution.  For instance, we may simply not want companies to use lax security 
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when collecting, storing, and disclosing sensitive PII; consumer notice and choice, no 
matter how implemented, would provide no clear benefits in such a case because, 
arguably, only one right choice exists.  Instead, we might prescribe what types of security 
protocols companies must adopt when dealing with such PII.  Notice and choice seem to 
work best in scenarios where only simple, straightforward messages are to be conveyed 
and where we think it makes sense for consumers to have a choice.  Listing third party 
recipients as discussed herein or the calories associated with a particular food are two 
such examples.   
¶109  For other issues, even if textual notice and choice is not the right solution, some 
form of “visceral” notice and choice may be.212  As information collection, use, and 
dissemination grows increasingly sophisticated, the approaches to protecting information 
privacy must do likewise.  Indeed, if the current piecemeal approach to information 
privacy doesn’t become an anachronism, information privacy almost certainly will.  
Addressing information privacy should be done in a manner that befits the issue.  In the 
case of the Incognito and Onward Transfer Problems, a textual approach of notice and 
choice, as proposed in this Article, shows some promise.  Other pieces of the privacy 
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